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Abstract. The existence of God is once again the focus of vivid philosophical 
discussion. From the point of view of analytic theology, however, people often 
talk past each other when they debate about the putative existence or non-
existence of God. In the worst case, for instance, atheists deny the existence 
of a God, which no theists ever claimed to exist. In order to avoid confusions 
like this we need to be clear about the function of the term ‘God’ in its different 
contexts of use. In what follows, I distinguish between the functions of ‘God’ in 
philosophical contexts on the one hand and in theological contexts on the other 
in order to provide a schema, which helps to avoid confusion in the debate on 
the existence or non-existence of God.
INTroDuCTIoN
A fundamental question of metaphysical speculation concerns the 
existence of God. In order to answer it philosophers do not hesitate 
to point to the numerous arguments for and against the existence of 
God that have been developed and evaluated throughout the history of 
mankind. often, however, too little reflection is directed upon what the 
arguments actually show, and upon how their conclusions or premises 
logically relate to the deployed concept of God. In what follows, I firstly 
provide a brief analysis of the argumentative structure of so-called 
arguments for the existence of God and then argue that the term ‘God’ is 
not a genuine philosophical but a theological concept philosophers could 
entirely dispense with since philosophy is only interested in questions 
concerning the ultimate ground of reality – in whichever way we have to 
characterise this ground within the metaphysical paradigm we deploy.1
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In a second step I argue that it is theology that has a genuine interest 
to show that her concept of God is philosophically confirmed as the 
adequate concept of the ultimate ground of reality, whereas the adequacy 
of the theological concept of God originates primarily out of scriptural 
and not out of philosophical considerations. The question of whether 
God exists, then, according to its form, is the question of whether the 
best philosophical account of the ultimate ground of reality confirms 
the existence of what the theologians call ‘God’. Consequently, in the 
framework developed, the proper context of use of so-called arguments 
against the existence of God is not a philosophical but a genuine 
theological one: arguments against the existence of God are arguments 
according to which there is a mismatch between philosophical accounts 
of the ultimate ground of reality and a particular theological conception 
of the divine that happens to function like an account of the ultimate 
ground of reality.1
I. THe FuNCTIoN oF ‘GoD’ IN PHIlosoPHY
As with arguments in other fields of philosophy, arguments for 
the existence of God can be classified by twice deploying a twofold 
distinction: they can be classified according to the way their premises 
are justified and also according to the way in which the alleged truth of 
the premises transfers truth on the conclusion of the argument. If at least 
one of the premises is justified by way of our experience of the world, the 
argument is called a posteriori. If each premise is justified independent 
from experience, it is an a priori argument. If it is not possible that 
the premises are true and the conclusion false, then the argument is 
a deductive one. If the truth of the premises does not entail the truth of 
the conclusion of the argument but nevertheless bestows a reasonable 
probability of being true on it, then the argument is an inductive one. 
In what follows, I focus only on so-called deductive arguments for the 
existence of God.2
The most popular deductive arguments for the existence of God 
are the ‘Five Ways’ of Thomas Aquinas and the so-called ‘ontological 
1 I use ‘concept’, ‘notion’, and ‘conception’ interchangeably. For an account that 
distinguishes between concepts and conceptions of God cf. Herrmann (2008).
2 The argument to come applies to deductive arguments as well as to inductive 
arguments for the existence of God. Cf. swinburne (2004) for an inductive argument for 
the existence of God.
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Arguments’ suggested by Anselm from Canterbury. The Five Ways are 
a posteriori; the ontological Argument is a priori.
saint Thomas states his Five Ways as follows, and although knowledge 
of them is common, it is worth quoting them in length:
The existence of God can be proved in five ways. The first and more 
manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to 
our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever 
is in motion is put in motion by another. (...) If that by which it is put 
in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in 
motion by another, and that by another again. but this cannot go on to 
infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, 
no other mover (...) Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put 
in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
 The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the 
world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no 
case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to 
be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is 
impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, 
because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of 
the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate 
cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to 
take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no 
first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any 
intermediate cause. (...) Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient 
cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
 The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs 
thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since 
they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they 
are possible to be and not to be. but it is impossible for these always to 
exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, 
if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been 
nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be 
nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to 
exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was 
in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun 
to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence – which is 
absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must 
exist something the existence of which is necessary. (...) Therefore we 
cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own 
necessity (...) This all men speak of as God.
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 The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. 
Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble 
and the like. but ‘more’ and ‘less’ are predicated of different things, 
according as they resemble in their different ways something which is 
the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly 
resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, 
something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which 
is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest 
in being(...) Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that 
genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. 
Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of 
their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
 The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see 
that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an 
end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in 
the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not 
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever 
lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by 
some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is 
shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by 
whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call 
God. (Aquinas: summa Theologica, Prima Pars Q2A3)
The argumentative structure of these arguments is as follows: firstly, 
a premise concerning a fundamental phenomenon of the world is stated 
and justified by way of reliance on our experience of the world, let’s call 
this kind of premise the experiential base of the argument.3 secondly, 
further premises provide a conceptual and metaphysical analysis of the 
phenomenon in question according to which it could not exist unless 
there is a certain ultimate ground with features sufficient to explain the 
existence of the phenomenon in question; let us call these premises the 
conceptual base, or the metaphysical paradigm of the argument. Thirdly, 
it is concluded deductively that given the experiential and the conceptual 
base of the argument it follows that the ultimate ground specified in the 
conceptual base has to exist. Fourthly, it is announced that we call this 
3 When I speak about the logic of these arguments, what I have in mind is their 
argumentative structure, and not a particular formalisation of these arguments. For 
different formalisations of these arguments, and their corresponding problems, cf. 
ricken (1998) and sobel (2004).
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ultimate ground ‘God’, let us call this kind of announcement the act of 
baptism of the argument.
Given the distinction between the experiential base, the conceptual 
base, and the act of baptism, we can structure the Five Ways roughly as 
follows. The experiential base is: (1) There is motion in the world, (2) 
there is efficient causation in the world, (3) there is possibility in the 
world, (4) there is gradation in the world, and (5) there is governance of 
unintelligent beings in the world. The conceptual base is as follows: (1a) 
whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another and this cannot 
be an actually infinite series, (2a) whatever is an efficient cause needs 
another efficient cause and this series cannot be actually infinite, (3a) 
if each entity possibly does not exist, then there is a time when nothing 
exists which entails that nothing could exist now, (4a) graduation is 
possible only if there is maximal realisation of what is graduated, and 
(5a) governance of unintelligent beings entails that there is something 
directing these beings. Deductively based upon their experiential and 
conceptual base, the arguments generate the following conclusions, 
respectively: (1b) there is an unmoved mover, (2b) there is an uncaused 
cause, (3b) there is a necessary being, (4b) there is a maximal realisation of 
every perfection, and (5b) there is a being which directs all unintelligent 
beings to their end. each conclusion is followed by a corresponding act 
of baptism, according to which this is what everybody calls God, or refers 
to as ‘God’ or understands to be God.
There are at least two problems with these so-called arguments for 
the existence of God. The first problem is intrinsic to each argument if 
it is understood to be an argument for the existence of God; the second 
problem emerges once the Five Ways are seen in total.
The intrinsic problem of each of the Five Ways is that none of them 
actually concludes by way of asserting the existence of God. Their 
philosophical conclusions are much more decent. once the philosophical 
work is done, they only conclude that there is an unmoved mover, 
respectively an uncaused cause, respectively a final cause upon which 
all is directed, etc. The term ‘God’ comes into play only in the act of 
baptism, which from a logical point of view is an arbitrary addendum 
to the argument, and not part of the argument itself insofar as its logical 
structure is concerned.4
4 Cf. also meixner (2012: 175): ‘Nothing in Thomas Aquinas’s argument (...) justifies 
the conclusion that this agent which is a first cause is God or even a god.’ Cf. also meixner 
(2009: 34).
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The extrinsic problem comes into focus once we consider the Five 
Ways in sum. since Thomas deploys the same act of baptism at the end 
of each of his ways, he generates the impression that of necessity the 
unmoved mover has to be the uncaused cause, has to be a necessary 
being, has to be the final goal of nature, has to be maximal perfection. 
However, without further philosophical argument one is justified to 
doubt whether it is really the existence of one and the same entity that all 
these arguments point to if what is established, if they are sound, is only 
that there is an unmoved mover and an uncaused cause, etc. Thomas 
would have needed an argument that of necessity the uncaused cause is 
the unmoved mover, etc., in order to persuade philosophers that there is 
reference to exactly one entity in the Five Ways.
let us turn to Anselm’s ‘ontological arguments’ and analyse their 
argumentative structure. Anselm states them as follows:
And so, Lord, do thou, who dost give understanding to faith, give me, so 
far as thou knowest it to be profitable, to understand that thou art as we 
believe; and that thou art that which we believe. And indeed, we believe 
that thou art a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. or 
is there no such nature, since the fool hath said in his heart, there is no 
God? (Psalms 14:1). but, at any rate, this very fool, when he hears of 
this being of which I speak – a being than which nothing greater can 
be conceived – understands what he hears, and what he understands is 
in his understanding; although he does not understand it to exist. For, 
it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to 
understand that the object exists. (...) Hence, even the fool is convinced 
that something exists in the understanding, at least, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. 
And whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. And assuredly 
that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the 
understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: 
then it can be conceived to exist in reality; which is greater. Therefore, 
if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the 
understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. but obviously 
this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, 
than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the 
understanding and in reality.
God cannot be conceived not to exist. God is that, than which nothing 
greater can be conceived. That which can be conceived not to exist is not 
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God. And it assuredly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to 
exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being, which cannot be conceived 
not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to 
exist. Hence, if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be 
conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be 
conceived. but this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so 
truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that 
it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being thou art, o Lord, 
our God. (Anselm: Proslogion, Ch. 2 & 3)
The argumentative structure of these arguments is as follows: firstly, 
a stipulative definition of the term ‘God’ is provided and specified in 
terms of a definite description; let us call this the definition base of the 
argument. secondly, conceptual and metaphysical reflections are spelled 
out according to which one obtains a contradiction if one assumes that 
there is no such entity as specified in the definition; let us call this kind 
of premises again the conceptual base, respectively the metaphysical 
paradigm of the argument. Thirdly, it is concluded that given the 
definition base and the conceptual base, it is true that ‘God exists’ since 
the entity specified in the definition base of the argument exists.
Deploying the distinction between the definition base and the 
conceptual base we can structure both of Anselm’s ontological 
arguments as follows. The definition base of both is this: the term ‘God’ 
is synonymous with the definite description ‘that than which a greater 
cannot be imagined’. The conceptual base of the first ontological 
argument is: (1) that than which a greater cannot be imagined has to 
exist because otherwise it would not be that than which a greater cannot 
be imagined. The conceptual base of the second argument is: (2) that 
than which a greater cannot be imagined has to exist of necessity since 
something that cannot lack existence is greater than something that 
can lack existence. The conclusion of the first argument is that given 
the definition base of the argument it is true to assert that ‘God exists’, 
and the conclusion of the second is a modal intensification according to 
which it is true that ‘God exists necessarily’.
ontological arguments suffer from the same intrinsic problem as 
the mentioned a posteriori arguments.5 The genuine philosophical job 
is done without need of or reference to the concept of God. The only 
5 unlike the Five Ways, they are not subject to an extrinsic problem since both 
ontological arguments are based on the same definition base.
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important phrase is ‘that, than which a greater cannot be conceived’. 
However, in contrast to the analysed a posteriori arguments, where 
from a logical point of view the act of baptism is an arbitrary addition 
at the end of the argument, a priori arguments proceed the other way 
about and start with the definition base, which like the act of baptism 
of the Five Ways is not a proper part of the philosophical argument as 
such. The argument, if sound, only shows that there is that than which 
a greater cannot be conceived – as such it is independent of ‘God’.
What we said about the argumentative structure of the most popular 
a posteriori and a priori arguments for the existence of God mutatis 
mutandis applies to any so-called philosophical argument for the 
existence of God.
Firstly, any a posteriori argument of necessity implicitly or explicitly 
has the following logical form: (1) Experiential Base, (2) Conceptual Base, 
(3) Conclusion, (4) Act of Baptism. For instance, take the argument from 
fine-tuning. roughly, the experiential base asserts that the universe is 
fine-tuned, while the metaphysical paradigm of the argument firstly states 
that the fine-tuning of the universe is due to physical necessity, chance, or 
a designer and then proceeds to argue that neither physical necessity nor 
chance can reasonably account for the fine-tuning of the universe. The 
conclusion states that, therefore, there is a designer of the universe. Finally, 
the act of baptism stipulates that the designer is what we call ‘God’.6
secondly, as regards so-called a priori arguments for the existence 
of God, the general argumentative structure is as follows: (1) Definition 
Base, (2) Conceptual Base, (3) Conclusion. Take, for instance, a look at 
Descartes’ ontological argument:
but if the mere fact that I can produce from my thought the idea of 
something entails that everything which I clearly and distinctly perceive 
to belong to that thing really does belong to it, is not this a possible basis 
for another argument to prove the existence of God? Certainly, the idea 
of God, or a supremely perfect being, is one that I find within me just as 
surely as the idea of any shape or number. And my understanding that 
it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct 
than is the case when I prove of any shape or number that some property 
belongs to its nature. (Descartes 1996: 45)7
6 For more on the argument from fine-tuning cf. monton (2006). In general, any 
arbitrarily chosen a posteriori argument for the existence of God can be stated in such 
a way that it exhibits the mentioned argumentative form.
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The definition base of the argument is that ‘God’ is an abbreviation 
for ‘a supremely perfect being’. The conceptual base firstly asserts that 
everything, which clearly and distinctively is perceived to belong to 
the idea of a supremely perfect being, also belongs to it in reality. 
The conceptual base then goes on to argue that existence is perceived 
to belong to the idea of a supremely perfect being, which is why the 
conclusion states that since a supremely perfect being exists, it is true to 
assert7‘God exists’.8
Therefore, as far as the structure of so-called arguments for the 
existence of God is concerned, we can conclude the following: firstly, 
philosophy could entirely dispense with the concept of God without 
losing any of its genuine argumentative force. The reason, as we have 
shown, is that in a philosophical context ‘God’ is either just a name 
amongst other names of which in an act of baptism we have to decide 
how to deploy, or else is used as an abbreviation for a particular definite 
description as specified in the definition base of the corresponding 
argument.9 since philosophy is neither interested in acts of baptism nor 
in stipulative definitions of particular terms, we could simply dispense 
with ‘God’. secondly, however, instead of deleting the term ‘God’ we 
could also explicitly identify its philosophical function as an unrestricted 
semantic placeholder for whatever it is that our respective metaphysical 
paradigm commits us to assume as regards the nature of the ultimate 
ground of reality.10
According to this option, the meaning of the assertion ‘God exists’ 
is a function of the metaphysical paradigm in which it is stated and 
consequently can express different views about the ultimate ground of 
reality in dependence of the paradigm in which it is expressed. In other 
words, in a philosophical context, the assertion that ‘God exists’ means 
7 Cf. Wee (2012) for further analysis of this argument.
8 In general, any arbitrarily chosen a priori argument for the existence of God can be 
stated in such a way that it exhibits the mentioned argumentative form.
09 This can be nicely observed in the passage quoted from Descartes, where he says: 
‘the idea of God, or a supremely perfect being.’ The argument could entirely be stated 
without reference to the term ‘God’ since it is concerned only with the existence of 
a supremely perfect being.
10 This use of the term ‘God’ is what I take Fischer to mean when he says, ‘I assume 
that the term “God” is a descriptive expression used to mark a certain role, rather than 
a proper name’ (Fischer 1989: 87). It also fits with the observation of milem, when he 
states the following: ‘reason finds itself standing before a mystery, the cause of everything 
that exists, and gives this mystery the name “God”’ (milem 2007: 86).
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nothing over and above ‘In the metaphysical paradigm X, the ultimate 
ground of reality is Y’. The assertion ‘God exists’ thus is always a cypher 
for a particular Weltanschauung.
For instance, without the act of baptism, the Five Ways of Thomas 
precisely have the function of philosophical arguments that are directed 
at an illumination of the ultimate ground of reality, an explanation, 
which is based on our experience of the world and the metaphysical 
paradigm within which Thomas was operating. Therefore, when Thomas 
asserts ‘God exists’, what he expresses is a particular conception of the 
ultimate ground of reality based on certain metaphysical assumptions 
like the impossibility of an actual infinitude. In contrast, when, say, 
leibniz asserts that ‘God exists’, then he expresses a different account 
of the ultimate ground of reality, since he did not assume that an actual 
infinitude is impossible (cf. laerke 2011). It is a great source of confusion 
if one is not aware of the fact that the assertion ‘God exists’ expresses 
entirely different accounts of the ultimate ground of reality in different 
contexts and instead treats the concept of God independent from the 
philosophical context out of which it once originated.
In sum, our analysis of so-called arguments for the existence of God 
showed that in reference to their argumentative structure, ‘God’ is either 
introduced in an act of baptism for the entity specified in the conclusion 
of the argument or else is stipulated as an abbreviation for a certain 
definite description. Arguments for the existence of God could dispense 
with the term ‘God’ without losing any of their genuine philosophical 
force as arguments concerning the ultimate ground of reality. If the term 
‘God’ is nevertheless deployed in philosophical discussions, one has to 
be aware that it functions like an unrestricted semantic placeholder for 
whatever it is that the metaphysical paradigm deployed commits us to 
assume as regards the nature of the ultimate ground of reality.
II. THe FuNCTIoN oF ‘GoD’ IN THeoloGY
We have analysed the function of the term ‘God’ in so-called 
philosophical arguments for the existence of God. However, philosophy 
is only a secondary context in which ‘God’ figures as a prominent role. 
Primarily, ‘God’ is a theological notion that originated in the religious life 
of early human societies, and consequently has its own traditional use 
and development independent from philosophy.11
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In11Western theological tradition, what we mean by ‘God’ is closely 
related to what we understand the bible to say about God.12 It would 
be ideal if the bible provided a neat and clear-cut definition of God so 
that we could in principle replace any biblical mentioning of God with 
such a definition salva veritate. unfortunately, this is an idle dream: 
in the discussion of these matters, we tend to forget the fact that the 
monotheistic conception of God that the bible deals with is by no means 
a monolithic one.13 Jewish, and therefore Christian monotheism in fact 
started as a monolatrism that entailed philosophical polytheism and it 
was not before the time of Deuteroisaiah that an explicit monotheism 
was established as part of the theological reaction to the babylonian 
exile. Therefore, there is no single complete and unanimous conception 
of God that is intrinsically and unambiguously based on scripture. The 
books of scripture themselves reflect a process of clarifying what is or 
could be meant by the term ‘God’.14
However, although there is no such clear-cut conception to be 
found, after all, the bible is no philosophical disputation but a history 
of salvation, what theologians can positively agree upon is a minimal 
consensus that the God of the bible has certain features which of necessity 
belong to any theologically adequate concept of God  – regardless its 
further qualification.
The problem is to decide which elements exactly belong to the 
minimal consensus of a conception of God based on scripture. since 
there could be an absolutely adequate decision procedure in order to 
decide which parts of necessity belong to the minimal conception of 
God if and only if we had a prior and independent grasp on the God 
of the bible with which to compare scripture as regards its adequacy 
concerning the ‘proper’ use of the term ‘God’ in a theological context, 
11 Cf. Puntel (2008: 447): ‘“God” is originally not a philosophical concept, but a term 
arising in religions, and one with which many in part quite heterogeneous ideas have 
been and continue to be connected.’
12 I bracket other religious traditions like Islamic or Hindu traditions. The same 
kind of consideration, however, applies to these traditions as well insofar as they base 
their religious conceptions of God on revealed written or oral treatments of what they 
call ‘God’.
13 As Craig (2009: 71) says: ‘The concept of God is underdetermined by the biblical 
data.’ Apart from this difficulty, we also tend to forget that the phrase ‘the bible’ in 
different Christian Denominations refers to different corpi of revealed books and texts.
14 For more on the development of monotheism in Ancient Israel cf. Keel (1980), 
lang (1981), Wacker (1999), and becking et al. (2001).
140 beNeDIKT PAul GÖCKe
it seems that our best means to establish a certain minimal consensus 
as regards the conception of God to be found in the bible is by way of 
exegetical analysis of what the texts actually say.15
Although there is no room to develop this fully in the present paper, 
it seems to be plausible to agree that a minimal consensus at least entails 
the following: the God of the bible is supposed to be worthy of worship, 
supposed to be the creator of all that is, and supposed to share a deep 
and loving relationship with his creation that He wants to be saved.16 Any 
theological notion of God, which does not agree upon this minimal 
consensus, seems to be religiously and exegetically inadequate right from 
the start as a theological concept of the God of whom the bible speaks.
The minimal consensus is silent on many features, which we are 
used to associating with the God of the bible. For instance, the minimal 
consensus is silent on the questions of whether the bible assumes that 
God is everlasting or eternal, immutable or able to change. It is silent 
on these matters because there is scriptural evidence for each of these 
assumptions, which is to say that the minimal consensus can be extended 
in different, more fully developed concepts of God that are equally based 
on scripture but might contradict each other. In what follows, I deploy 
the term ‘God’ in such a way that it only refers to what is specified in the 
minimal consensus in order to avoid confusion.
15 According to Alston ‘experiential awareness of God, or as I shall be saying, the 
perception of God, makes an important contribution to the grounds of religious belief. 
more specifically, a person can become justified in holding certain kinds of beliefs 
about God by virtue of perceiving God as being or doing so-and-so’ (Alston 1991: 1). 
one could argue that there is no need for an exegetical account of the concept of God 
since it is possible to perceive God as being so-and-so. However, this seems to me to 
be problematic since one could always doubt that what is perceived is really the God of 
the bible. As Kaufman says, ‘in the monotheistic perspective, human beings do not live 
simply suspended before their creator, as it were, in direct and continuous face-to-face 
interaction with God’ (Kaufman 1981: 111).
16 It is unclear whether there can be an adequate clarification of the conditions 
necessary and sufficient to be an ‘object’ worthy of worship, which at the same time 
grounds in scripture and philosophical argument about what it means to be worthy of 
worship. If the God of the bible could simply be understood to be an object worthy 
of worship, whereas the analysis of what it is to be an object worthy of worship is 
achieved purely by philosophical means, then the bible is simply pointless as regards the 
qualification of God insofar as he is factually described in scripture. The problem is that 
from a philosophical point of view one quickly arrives at the conclusion that an object 
worthy of worship has to be the perfect being, which has all its qualities essentially and 
necessarily. Cf. Findlay (1955: 52-3).
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As regards the function of ‘God’ in a purely theological context, we 
can state the following: Firstly, ‘God’ functions as a name for the deity 
which revealed itself firstly to the tribes of Israel and then revealed itself 
in Jesus Christ to all of mankind, whereas scripture and the history of the 
tribes of Israel are taken to be sufficient evidence for the existence of this 
deity. Although it might be unclear how to specify further exegetically 
the minimal consensus as regards the concept of God deployed in the 
bible, there is no genuine theological discussion about whether this deity 
exists or not. It is a necessary presumption of theology to assume that the 
God of whom the bible speaks exists.
However, secondly, although in a purely theological context, ‘God’ 
functions like a name, the minimal consensus which theology spells 
out in the description of this deity also has the form of a genuine 
philosophical account of the ultimate ground of reality. Now, Tertullian 
once asked, ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? or the Academy 
with the Church?’ (Tertullian: De Praescriptione vii). From a systematic 
point of view, the answer is as follows: as such Athens has nothing to 
do with Jerusalem. However, Jerusalem happens to possess something 
that has the form of a philosophical account of the ultimate ground of 
reality and therefore is eo ipso interesting to the Academy, particularly 
given that the way Jerusalem obtained this account is based primarily on 
revelation and not on philosophical argument. That is to say, the way the 
theological concept of ‘God’ enters philosophical territory is asymptotic 
to the nature of philosophy since whatever is known about the God of 
the bible is supposed to be known primarily through divine revelation 
and not through philosophical argument.
In the very moment in which theology enters philosophical 
discussion, it also constitutes the very intelligibility of atheism. When-
ever there is a particular conception of God of which the theologian says 
that it is an adequate scriptural understanding of the God of the bible, 
then it is eo ipso possible that philosophy rejects such a  theological 
notion of God as an adequate notion of the ultimate ground of reality. 
based on this understanding, so-called arguments against the existence 
of God are arguments according to which there is a mismatch between 
a  theological notion of God and the philosophical account of the 
ultimate ground of reality.
For instance, suppose that the theologian argues that scripture 
confirms that the God of the bible, in addition to what is specified in the 
minimal consensus, is also omnipotent, omniscient and morally perfect. 
142 beNeDIKT PAul GÖCKe
Given this understanding of the term ‘God’, philosophers argue that if 
‘God’ is meant to mean this, then there could be no evil in the world. 
since, however, there is evil in this world, the philosopher concludes that 
‘God’ thus understood is not an adequate account of the ultimate ground 
of reality, and that therefore it is true to assert that ‘God does not exist’.17
In situations like these, given the soundness of the respective arguments, 
the theologian has two options how to react. either the theologian 
argues that the attacked conception of God is in fact adequately based 
on scripture and is the only adequate interpretation or he argues that 
precisely those features of the theological conception of God that lead to 
a contradiction with a philosophical account of the ultimate ground of 
reality do not of necessity belong to the theological concept of God.
If the theologian supposes that the conception of God under attack 
is the only adequate understanding of ‘God’, then atheism or religious 
fundamentalism are the reactions to follow. Atheism on side of the 
philosophers because one is justified to assert that God (as qualified) does 
not exist. religious fundamentalism follows on side of the theologian 
because he assumes to possess an ultimate truth based on scripture, 
which contradicts human reason. Neither consequence is desirable. 
since we have already seen above that there is no single and unambiguous 
clear-cut definition of God based on scripture, the reasonable theologian 
should opt for the second option.
Choosing the second option, the theologian has to be open minded 
and accept that any concept of God, which goes beyond the minimal 
consensus, might always be open to revision. However, given that 
scripture itself shows a development and change in the concept of God, 
this does not seem to be too much of a problem. The only move the 
theologian cannot make is to reject elements that belong to the minimal 
consensus of the theological notion of God, which is to say that the 
only strictly atheistic argument would be an argument that the ultimate 
ground of reality cannot be a loving creator that wants us to be saved.18
17 Cf. mackie: ‘In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is 
wholly good; and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between these 
three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third would be false. but at 
the same time all three are essential parts of most theological positions: the theologian, it 
seems, at once must adhere and cannot consistently adhere to all three.’ (mackie 1955: 200)
18 I have to confess that I have not the slightest idea how such an argument could look 
like. Certainly, arguments from evil will not do the job since the theological notion of 
God is, as far as I can see, simply consistent with there being evil in the world.
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In sum, the function of ‘God’ in a purely theological context is to 
serve as a name that refers to the God of whom the bible speaks, 
whereas exegetical analyses of scripture specify a minimal consensus 
of the qualities we have to assume to belong to the God of the bible. 
The theological concept of God enters philosophical discourse because 
it happens to be an account of the ultimate ground of reality which 
is reached at through revelation and not philosophical argument. 
Arguments against the existence of God are arguments according to 
which there is a mismatch between theological notions of God and 
philosophical accounts of the ultimate ground of reality.
III. A sCHemA To AVoID CoNFusIoN
We have reached the following conclusions: Firstly, philosophy can 
entirely dispense with the term ‘God’ since it is an unrestricted semantic 
placeholder for the ultimate ground of reality. secondly, theology specifies 
particular concepts of God based on an interpretation of scripture, 
whereas there is a minimal consensus as regards the meaning of ‘God’ 
as a theological term. Arguments for the existence of God are arguments 
that show that the theological and intrinsically non-philosophical notion 
of the God of the bible in fact coheres with the philosophical account of 
the ultimate ground of reality. Arguments against the existence of God 
are arguments according to which the theological concept of God does 
not correspond with our knowledge of the ultimate ground of reality.
In order to avoid confusion in our discussions about the existence or 
non-existence of God, the following schema is of some help:
(1) If somebody asserts that ‘God exists’, then it needs to be clarified 
whether (a) he deploys a philosophical concept of God as a placeholder 
for the ultimate ground of reality which he calls ‘God’ or whether (b) he 
deploys a theological concept of God based on scripture.
If (a), then ‘God exists’ can be translated into a proposition, which 
does not deploy the term ‘God’ but specifies an account of the ultimate 
ground of reality. The philosophically interesting questions here are 
whether the argument proposed to arrive at the suggested conception of 
the ultimate ground is sound and whether the metaphysical paradigm in 
which it is stated is plausible itself.
If (b), then the statement ‘God exists’ can be translated into 
a proposition, which does not deploy the term ‘God’ but specifies at least 
a minimal consensus of what is meant by ‘God’ given scriptural evidence. 
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In this case, the first question to be discussed is whether the suggested 
theological surrogate for the term ‘God’ is adequately based on scripture. 
If it is not, then this particular assertion that ‘God exists’ is irrelevant 
from a theological point of view. The second question to be discussed is 
whether the philosophical account of the ultimate ground confirms the 
existence of what the theologians call ‘God’.
(2) If somebody asserts ‘God does not exist’, then it needs to be clarified 
whether (a*) he deploys a philosophical concept of God as a placeholder 
for the ultimate ground of reality, which he calls ‘God’ or whether (b*) he 
deploys a theological concept of God based on scripture.
If (a*), then ‘God does not exist’ can be translated into a proposition, 
which does not deploy the term ‘God’ but specifies a denial of a particular 
account of the ultimate ground of reality. The philosophically interesting 
questions then are whether the argument proposed to arrive at this 
denial is sound and whether the metaphysical paradigm in which it is 
stated is plausible itself.
If (b*), then the statement ‘God does not exist’ can be translated into 
a proposition, which does not deploy the term ‘God’ but specifies at 
least a minimal consensus of what is meant by ‘God’ given scriptural 
evidence. In this case, the first question that has to be discussed is 
whether the suggested theological surrogate for the term ‘God’ is 
adequately based on scripture. If it is not adequately based on scripture, 
then the corresponding assertion ‘God does not exist’ is without any 
rationale in itself. If, however, it is adequately based on scripture, then 
the interesting questions are whether the argument to arrive at the 
conclusion that the ultimate ground cannot have the features of the God 
of the bible is sound and whether the metaphysical paradigm in which 
it is stated is plausible itself. 19
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